Croatia by Butorac Malnar, Vlatka
From the book reviews:
(...) I consider the publication of the book very valuable. All analyses 
are deep, thorough and well structured. They will serve as a gold mine 
of information for all those who are interested in private enforcement of 
competition law, be it legislators, judges, practitioners and academics. 
The comparative dimension of the book will allow readers to evaluate 
each statements and solutions in the light of the legislative choices 
and judicial practice of other countries. The publication of the book 
will certainly contribute to the development of this kind of competition 
law enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe.
Dr hab. Maciej Szpunar, prof. UŚ
University of Silesia, Katowice;
advocate general, CJEU
All CEE (EU-) countries have recently been facing common need 
for implementation of the Damages Directive. These countries 
share something more common than geographical proximity and 
neighbourhood only. Their legal history and tradition and so called 
path-depenence often resemble, too. It is therefore important and 
useful to compare the starting positions of these countries, main 
problems accompanying the process of implementation and to 
discuss the possibilities how to solve and overcome the difficulties 
and obstacles connected therewith. The book contributes without 
any doubts to achieving this goal.
Prof. Dr. Josef Bejček
Masaryk University, Brno
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Anna Piszcz* 
Introduction to the issues of the implementation 
of the EU Damages Directive in CEE countries
This summer, the Law Faculty of the University of Białystok (UwB) and 
the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies of the University of Warsaw 
(CARS) co-organise the 2nd International Conference on Harmonisation of 
Private Antitrust Enforcement: Central and Eastern European Perspective, 
an event held in Supraśl (north-eastern Poland). 
The first conference of the series took place on 2–4 July 2015 also in 
Supraśl.1 The series has a history starting as early as mid-2014. A couple 
of months before the final adoption of the EU Damages Directive,2 
Prof.  dr  hab. Tadeusz Skoczny, the Director of CARS, asked me what 
was my recent favourite research topic, and whether I planned to 
organise a conference thereon. I responded that I was very interested in 
the legislative works on the EU Damages Directive and that I hoped to 
organize an international conference with the theme of private competition 
law enforcement. Prof.  Skoczny’s response was to the point, ‘Let’s do 
it together!’ and… it started. Frankly speaking, I would most probably 
never have realised my aspiration without Prof. Skoczny. Moreover, I feel 
honoured to cooperate with both Prof. Skoczny himself and CARS, hailed 
as a leading competition law research unit in Poland. 
* Dr. Hab. in law, Professor at the University of Białystok, Faculty of Law, Department 
of Public Economic Law; piszcz@uwb.edu.pl. 
1 More information about the Conference can be found in the report by P. Korycińska-
-Rządca published in the Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 2016, vol. 8(12), 
p. 291–295.
2 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 
2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1.
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The first conference in Supraśl united an international community of 
experts, primarily from countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE 
countries), who are working on the topic of private competition law 
enforcement. The conference allowed them to share the experiences of 
CEE countries on issues related to the topic discussed, as well as formulating 
proposals with regard to the implementation of the Damages Directive 
while highlighting potential difficulties and drawbacks of the Directive. 
Furthermore, the conference, in its 1st edition, was preceded by a kick-off 
meeting of CRANE – the Competition Law and Regulation Academic 
Network, a special network of researchers originating from the Balkan, 
Baltic, Visegrad countries and Eastern Europe, founded by Prof. Skoczny. 
Our guests spent three intensive days in Supraśl, assisted by the friendly 
staff of the Department of Public Economic Law (Law Faculty, UwB). At 
the end of December 2015, the results of the meetings and discussions that 
took place during the first conference were published in the Yearbook of 
Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 2016, vol. 8(12). We were so satisfied with 
the outcome of the event that we decided shortly thereafter to co-organise 
its 2nd edition, scheduled after the deadline for the implementation of the 
Directive has passed, in order to compare the work done in the particular 
CEE countries. We considered several places to hold the second conference, 
but Supraśl ultimately won our hearts. Again, my younger colleagues from 
the Department of Public Economic Law are hard at work organising 
everything for the guests, including a social programme. 
This year’s conference is a two-day event (29–30 June) dedicated – as 
planned – to the implementation of the EU Damages Directive in our 
region. The conference will trace the implementation works throughout 
CEE countries from various perspectives, encompassing procedural and 
substantive law. It boasts a programme of presentations, ranging from those 
related to the scope of the implementation, through institutional, substantive 
and procedural issues, to reach, finally, consensual dispute resolution in 
antitrust enforcement. Some speakers will be returning to Supraśl after 
their first visit in 2015 while others will participate in our conference for 
the first time. Prof. Skoczny who celebrates his 70th birthday this year is 
a tireless organiser.3 It was his brilliant idea that the national reports on 
the implementation of the Directive in individual CEE countries should be 
written and published in the form of a book. Publishing the book before the 
3 2017 also marks the 10th anniversary of an important milestone for the research on 
competition law in Poland – in 2007, Prof. Skoczny founded CARS as a research 
organisation seated at the University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management. 
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conference gives its participants a great source of information on issues to 
be discussed during the conference. With this in mind, I managed to find 
representatives of eleven CEE countries who agreed to write comprehensive 
national reports. What I consider indisputable is that, due to the lack of 
relevant literature in English, it is relatively difficult for a researcher from 
a CEE country to examine and compare their respective national solutions 
with those of our closest neighbours. In that context, it is much easier for 
us to analyse and compare our legal provisions to the legal frameworks 
of Western countries. Therefore, I believe that this English-language book 
will shed invaluable new light on the process of the implementation of the 
Directive in CEE countries. 
Publishing the book a few weeks before the conference makes it possible 
to examine key concepts of the Damages Directive in relation to the national 
laws of eleven CEE countries. It needs to be clarified here that certain 
CEE countries already have new laws on private enforcement of EU and/
or national competition rules. However, not all of us have come this far, 
even though the deadline for the transposition lapsed on 27 December 
2016. Quite unexpectedly for us, for certain countries some of the discussed 
topics still remain almost as ‘fresh’ and relevant today as when they were 
discussed two years ago – the majority of CEE countries has not transposed 
the Directive into their national laws yet. As a result, some Authors describe 
already-binding laws, whereas others write about draft laws that might 
ultimately end up having a somewhat different shape. The tables of contents 
of all of the reports are very similar. From the very beginning, we wanted 
to ensure uniformity of the national reports and so I compiled a specific 
line-up of over a dozen of the most important questions relating to the 
implementation of the Directive. 
First of all, the national reports narrate the history of the works on the 
harmonisation of private antitrust enforcement in CEE countries. 
Second, the reports focus on the scope of the implementation of 
the Directive. The Damages Directive is restricted in its scope, a fact 
clearly noted in its very title. Seeing as the Directive only sets minimum 
requirements, did the drafters and/or legislatures of CEE countries 
choose these minimal solutions in spite of the excellent opportunity to 
introduce something more than the Directive? Firstly, the Directive refers 
to ‘actions for damages under national law’, whereas the system of private 
enforcement of competition law is made up of a variety of remedies. Here, 
in particular, injunctive relief (where the plaintiff requests the court to 
order the infringer to stop the violation and/or remove its effects) coexists 
with compensatory relief (damages) and declaratory relief, that is, the 
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declaration of invalidity (automatic nullity) of an agreement, decision of 
an association of undertakings or practice (S. Peyer mentions separately 
also interim remedies; see Peyer, 2012, p. 350). The Directive only takes 
into account actions for damages as defined in Article 2(4). An action 
for damages means ‘an action under national law by which a claim for 
damages is brought before a national court (…)’. Furthermore, pursuant 
to Article  2(5), a claim for damages means a claim for the compensation 
of harm caused by an infringement of competition law. However, beyond 
this there are claims for declaratory relief and injunctions. It can also be 
argued that, likewise, claims for the skimming-off of profits (ill-gotten gains) 
and the return of unjust enrichment (restitution of undue payment) are 
not included in the definition of a claim for damages. There is not much 
difference between those claims and claims for damages with respect to their 
nature (all of them are monetary claim), except that the function (goal) of 
the former category is not to compensate harm suffered by the injured party 
but, respectively, to deprive infringers of their illegal profits (disgorgement) 
and to reverse the unjust enrichment (Piszcz, 2015, p. 83 et seq.; Piszcz, 
2017a). The national reports show the manner in which this issue was 
dealt with by the drafters and/or legislatures of specific CEE countries. 
Next, the Damages Directive refers to ‘infringements of the competition 
law provisions’. Pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Damages Directive, an 
‘infringement of competition law’ means an infringement of Article 101 
or 102 TFEU or of national competition law. Further, Article 2(3) of 
the Directive stipulates that ‘national competition law means provisions 
of national law that predominantly pursue the same objective as Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU and that are applied to the same case and in parallel 
to Union competition law (…)’. However, competition law or competition 
protection covers a whole range of issues related not only to agreements, 
decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices (Article 
101 TFEU and equivalent national provisions) and abuses of a dominant 
position (Article 102 TFEU and equivalent national provisions). It also 
covers anticompetitive concentrations of undertakings, practices in the 
sphere of Article 106 TFEU and State aid, abuses of economic dependence 
or bargaining power and unfair competition. The reports show if drafters 
and/or national legislatures (similarly to Portuguese and Spanish ones) 
decided to go ‘beyond’ the ambit of the Damages Directive with regard 
to the types of infringements covered by the Directive or not. 
Furthermore, the Damages Directive refers to ‘competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union’. However, 
the already mentioned Article 2(3) of the Damages Directive defines 
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national competition law very narrowly. The definition quoted above is 
accompanied by Recital (10) of the Preamble stating that: ‘This Directive 
should not affect actions for damages in respect of infringements of national 
competition law which do not affect trade between Member States within 
the meaning of Article 101 or 102 TFEU’. The Directive distinguishes 
therefore between infringements which may affect internal trade and those 
which do not (purely national competition law infringements which cannot 
influence internal trade). The important conclusion from this provision 
is that the Directive does not require Member States to apply its own 
pattern with regard to purely national infringements; albeit Member 
States are free to do so. The fact has to be criticised therefore that the 
Directive does not contain an explicit provision – instead of Recital (10) 
of the Preamble – stating something like: ‘Nothing should prevent Member 
States from applying identical provisions also to infringements that do 
not harm internal trade within the meaning of Art. 101 or 102 TFEU’4 
or ‘This Directive does not impose an obligation upon Member States to 
use identical solutions to infringements that do not affect internal trade 
within the meaning of Art. 101 or 102 TFEU albeit it does provide such 
an incentive’5. Seeing that the Damages Directive refers in Recital (4) of 
its Preamble to ensuring the effectiveness of damages claims, I believe that 
the effectiveness requirement should relate to both EU law violations as 
well as purely national infringements. The national reports show whether 
CEE countries are going to apply double standards with respect to the 
two different types of infringements, especially considering that in practice 
the distinction between them is not that clear cut for a judge in a stand-
alone case.
A form of a restriction of the personal scope of the rules may also be 
found when implementing the Directive. In Article 2(2) of the Directive, 
an ‘infringer’ is defined as ‘an undertaking or association of undertakings 
which has committed an infringement of competition law’. The Directive 
does not provide autonomous definitions of the concept of an ‘undertaking’ 
and an ‘association of undertakings’, especially since these are not neutral 
concepts but have been developed in the case-law of the EU Courts in the 
context of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. As the Directive links the concept 
4 Cf Recital 8 of the Preamble to Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 21.05.2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial 
matters.
5 Cf Recital 19 of the Preamble to Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21.04.2004 creating a European Enforcement Order 
for uncontested claims. 
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of infringement by an undertaking or association of undertakings to the 
civil liability of that same undertaking or association of undertakings, it is 
possible to argue that enforcers will need to apply the rules stipulated in 
the Directive using the interpretations of both concepts developed in the 
context of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Wijckmans, Visser, Jaques and Noël, 
2015, p. 8). For the purposes of public enforcement of competition law, it is 
important to differentiate a single legal entity from a single economic entity 
which, under EU law, is also viewed as an undertaking. In terms of liability 
in proceedings before the European Commission, a parent company may be 
held legally liable for infringements of EU competition law committed by 
a subsidiary company, even if the parent company was not directly involved 
in the infringement of EU competition law. However, it should be kept in 
mind that national legal frameworks vary from Member State to Member 
State. The above solution is absent from some national competition law 
enforcement systems, which may result in an ‘inland’ discrimination in 
antitrust cases which are not governed by Articles 101 or 102 TFEU. Thus, 
a significant theme to be addressed by national lawmakers is the need 
(if any) to introduce a legal basis for the liability of the parent company 
for its subsidiaries (for its civil liability but also, if needed, for its liability 
for fines imposed by public enforcers), as it has already been done by 
Portugal and Spain. Considerations on this issue can be found in some of 
the national reports. 
Third, the national reports refer to the issue of competent national 
courts, since the institutional (‘technical’) design of private competition 
law enforcement is one of the main issues left to Member States to decide 
while transposing the Directive. The latter only points out that private 
enforcement of EU competition law must be left to national courts within 
the meaning of its Article 2(9), which refers to Article 267 TFEU. Member 
States may uphold their status quo or change it, preferably, in a balanced 
way. The national reports explain at length how CEE countries are resolving 
this issue.
Fourth, the reports also delve into the substantive law side of private 
competition law enforcement issues. In this context, four topics tend to be 
covered. First, the Authors of the reports dedicate their efforts to analysing 
the transposition of the Directive’s provisions on limitation periods. They 
show whether CEE countries introduced only the limitation period compliant 
with Article 10(3) of the Directive (period a tempore scientiae), or also 
a  second limitation period, which is not covered by the Directive, the 
course of which would not be dependent on the damaged entity’s knowledge 
of the infringement (a tempore facti). Moreover, Authors describe also 
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the manner in which CEE countries transposed the premise in the form 
of an injured party’s ‘knowledge’ of the occurrence of a competition law 
infringement, of the fact that the violation had caused harm to the potential 
claimant, and of the identity of the infringer or infringers (Article 10(2)). 
The reports show whether the drafters and/or legislatures chose to interrupt 
or to suspend the running of the limitation period (Article 10(4)), and how 
they approached situations involving two or more infringers in the context 
of limitation periods.
In the context of substantive law issues, the national reports cover also 
joint and several liability (and in some reports – type of liability as such). 
The reports are dedicated to the question whether CEE countries were 
at all in need of the introduction of the principle of joint and several civil 
liability of competition law infringers (Article 11(1) of the Directive), or 
whether it already existed in their legal frameworks. The reports present 
an entire spectrum of topics related to the implementation of the principles 
of liability of competition law infringers, which respect the interests of 
competition protection (Article 11(2)–(6) of the Directive) including the 
modified liability of SMEs and immunity recipients. 
The reports put an emphasis also on the quantification of harm. 
Article 17(2) of the Directive provides for a rebuttable presumption that 
cartel infringements cause harm. Article 17(1) is about the power of 
national courts to estimate the amount of harm, if it is established that 
a claimant suffered harm but it is practically impossible or excessively 
difficult precisely to quantify the harm suffered on the basis of the evidence 
available. Article 17(3), in turn, creates the possibility to strengthen and 
expand the cooperation between a NCA and national courts with respect 
to the quantification of harm. The reports cast a light on the approaches 
of CEE countries in this context. 
Furthermore, there is no doubt that rules on the passing-on of overcharges 
(Articles 12–16 of the Directive) have a vital role to play in national laws 
also, in particular in the context of the principle of full compensation. The 
reports show how the model provided by the Directive was used by their 
national legislatures. 
Fifth, procedural issues are also strongly represented throughout the 
national reports with topics ranging from standing to sue, disclosure of 
evidence and effect of national decisions, to the issue of collective redress. 
At the forefront here is a question of standing to sue, that is, who is entitled 
to apply to start judicial proceedings. This issue may be considered as one 
of the most important determinants of the number of antitrust damages 
actions. In the light of Article 2(4) of the Damages Directive, a claim for 
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damages may be brought before a national court by: an alleged injured party, 
or a natural or legal person that succeeded in the right of the alleged injured 
party, including the person that acquired the claim, or someone acting on 
behalf of one or more alleged injured parties, where Union or national 
law provides for that possibility. The national reports present how the issue 
of standing to sue is or is going to be regulated in their respective CEE 
countries. They also show whether business organisations and/or consumer 
organisations have standing to file private antitrust damages claims and, 
if not, whether the CEE countries were inspired to change their legal 
frameworks in this regard, even though the Directive does not require 
Member States to provide for the standing to sue of business organisations 
and/or consumer organisations. 
In the context of procedural law issues, the national reports discuss 
also the disclosure of evidence. Articles 5–8 of the Directive were adopted 
in an effort to reduce the information asymmetry that characterises the 
relationship between the claimant and the defendant in actions for damages 
based on competition law infringements and, therefore, improve the 
conditions for claimants to pursue their claims. The reports show here 
the approaches of the drafters or legislatures of their CEE countries to 
the principles of the disclosure of evidence, including its general principles 
as well as the specific principles applying to the disclosure of evidence 
included in the file of a competition authority and on the limits on the 
use of evidence obtained solely through access to the file of a competition 
authority. The Authors offer also their individual perspective on national 
sanctions regarding evidence (Article 8 of the Directive). 
Another issue emphasised in the reports is the change in the laws of 
CEE countries regarding the effect of national decisions. Article 9 of the 
Damages Directive contains the visibly minimised version, compared to its 
earliest drafts, of rules on the effect of NCAs’ final infringement decisions 
on subsequent actions for damages (Pais and Piszcz, 2014, p. 230). The 
essential element of this concept, an irrefutable (absolute) presumption of 
an infringement, is limited to the non-cross-border effect of such decisions. 
In other words, such decisions are binding only on the courts of the same 
Member State where the decision was adopted by the NCA (Article 9(1)). 
Further on, Article 9(2) of the Directive states that ‘Member States shall 
ensure that where a final decision referred to in paragraph 1 is taken in 
another Member State, that final decision may, in accordance with national 
law, be presented before their national courts as at least prima facie evidence 
that an infringement of competition law has occurred and, as appropriate, 
may be assessed along with any other evidence adduced by the parties’. 
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The quoted provision constitutes a minimum harmonisation clause that 
accounts for a cross-border effect of national decisions. This gives Member 
States a choice as to whether they wish their courts to be: bound by those 
decisions; governed in their assessments by an irrefutable or rebuttable 
presumption, or obliged to treat them as prima facie evidence. It is important 
to note that the concept of prima facie evidence comes from common law, 
a distinct legal family with its own legal tradition and as such it is adapted 
to the needs of common law. The national peculiarities of EU Member 
States with other legal traditions, such as the CEE countries, might not have 
been taken into account when Article 9(2) of the Directive was drafted. 
The national reports discuss therefore the issue of the ‘reformulation’ of 
the laws of CEE countries so that they comply with the above rules. 
Consecutively, the national reports shed light on collective private 
enforcement of competition law in CEE countries. EU Member States can 
decide on the use of collective redress mechanisms in private enforcement 
of competition law. Recital (13) sentence 2 of the Preamble of the Directive 
confirms that Member States are not required to introduce collective redress 
mechanisms for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. On the 
other hand, Recital (7) of the Preamble of the Recommendation on collective 
redress6 lists competition and consumer protection (alongside environmental 
protection, protection of personal data, financial services legislation and 
investor protection) as areas where supplementary private enforcement 
of rights granted under EU law in the form of collective redress is of 
value. The combination of the Recommendation on collective redress and 
Recital (13) of the Preamble of the Directive make the conclusion possible 
that ‘the fears of the excess of the American experience in the context of 
class actions, combined with the strong tradition and trust in European 
antitrust public enforcement, in the end led the European institutions to 
apparently discourage the use of collective redress’ (Pais, 2016, p. 201). It 
is worth remembering that collective redress may play an important role 
in Member States, not only in terms of procedural efficiency but also in 
relation to the enforcement of competition law by indirect purchasers. In 
the absence of some form of collective action, claims of indirect purchasers 
are unlikely to increase (Cauffman and Philipsen, 2014, p. 27). Although 
only a few CEE countries have legal frameworks for collective redress, 
this topic has not been omitted by the national reports. The reports show 
6 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law; OJ 2003 L 201, p. 60. 
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whether the legislatures of CEE countries have taken the opportunity to 
address the need, if any, for the introduction of this concept or for the 
amendments to already existing solutions. 
Up next is consensual dispute resolution in antitrust enforcement 
(Articles 18–19 of the Directive). In recent years, the role of the consensual 
dispute resolution mechanism has become more important than ever before 
in resolving disputes. In addition to being one of the cheapest dispute 
resolution mechanisms, it shortens the time of dispute resolution and 
sustains a healthier business environment). The national reports explore 
the approaches of CEE countries to solutions provided for in the Directive 
with regard to consensual dispute resolution in antitrust enforcement. 
The scope of the book is restricted to CEE countries but its subject 
matter is not about the eleven of us, but about all the EU Member 
States that face the same duties under the Damages Directive. What is 
of difference is that our region has so far remained almost untouched 
by the phenomenon of private competition law enforcement, compared 
to some Western jurisdictions, even though infringements of competition 
law occur, and are being dealt with by competition authorities responsible 
for public competition law enforcement. This begs the question: will the 
local attitude of consumers and undertakings be in step with the laws 
implementing the Damages Directive that create new possibilities for those 
injured by competition law infringements? I do hope to verify this after the 
implementation of the Directive in our region and several years at least 
of the application of the implementing provisions. 
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Anton Petrov*
BULGARIA 
I. Manner of implementing the Directive
Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions (the ‘Directive’) was 
adopted on 26 November 2014 and published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union on 5 December 2014. The Bulgarian national competition 
authority – the Commission on Protection of Competition (‘CPC’) – 
promptly recognized the transposition of the Directive into Bulgarian law 
as one of its priorities for 2015.1 The CPC set up an internal working group, 
which within several months prepared a proposal for implementation via 
amendments in the Protection of Competition Act2 (‘PCA’).3 The original 
* Doctor in International Law (Bulgarian Academy of Science, Institute for Legal Studies); 
senior associate in the law firm Djingov, Gouginski, Kyutchukov & Velichkov (Sofia, 
Bulgaria) specialising in competition law and regulation of cross-border trade; anton.
petrov@outlook.com. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions to which he is affiliated, 
or the official policy or position of any Bulgarian law enforcement agency. 
1 CPC Annual Report for 2014, adopted by decision no. 431 of 25.05.2015, p. 57.
2 Protection of Competition Act (Закон за защита на конкуренцията), promulgated in State 
Gazette no. 102 of 28.11.2008, in force as of 2.12.2008. This is the third version of the 
act, which was drafted with the assistance of the Italian competition authority (Autorità 
garante della concorrenza e del mercato) and EU financial support under the PHARE 
programme. Bulgaria introduced competition legislation in 1991 with the adoption of the 
first PCA (promulgated in State Gazette no. 39 of 17.05.1991, in force as of 20.05.1991). 
It was soon revised in line with modern EU competition law doctrine, which became the 
basis for the development of national antitrust and merger control rules, with the adoption 
of another PCA in 1998 (promulgated in State Gazette no. 52 of 8.05.1998, in force as 
of 11.05.1998). Ten years later, at the end of 2008, following Bulgaria’s accession to the 
EU on 1.01.2007, the current third instalment of the PCA came into force, which further 
harmonized the procedure for antitrust enforcement and merger control in line with the 
changes which were introduced with Regulation 1/2003 and Regulation 139/2004.
3 CPC Annual Report for 2015, adopted by decision no. 366 of 26.05.2015, p. 53.
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approach was to follow as closely as possible the text of the Directive. 
This first draft was not circulated in public, since in the final months of 
2015 a dedicated inter-departmental working group was created, comprising 
representatives from the CPC, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry 
of Justice, with the task to prepare a joint legislative proposal. No external 
experts were invited to participate in the working sessions of the group, 
and there is no official information whether the European Commission 
(‘EC’) was consulted in the process.
The inter-departmental working group approved a final draft by June 
2016, but its publication was deferred for several months – until September 
2016. The implementing legislation represents a bill for an amendment to 
the PCA (‘BAPCA’), replacing the currently existing four paragraphs of 
Article 104 on liability for damages with a full new Chapter XV, comprising 
16 articles, and adding 26 new and revised definitions in paragraph  1 of 
the supplementary provisions of the act. The draft does not envisage 
amendments to other existing legislation.
The new PCA chapter on ‘Liability for Damages’ is divided into two 
sections. The first section contains general rules confirming the right of 
any party that has suffered damages as a result of violations committed 
under the PCA to seek indemnification from the tortfeasor, irrespective of 
the nature of the infringement. The second section contains detailed rules 
on liability for damages caused by antitrust violations committed under 
Chapter III ‘Prohibited Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices’ and 
Chapter  IV ‘Abuse of Monopoly and Dominant Position’ of the PCA, as 
well as under Article 101 and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (‘TFEU’).
The final part of the BAPCA contains a single transitional provision 
specifying that all litigation proceedings pending as of the date of entry into 
force of the PCA amendments should be completed in accordance with the 
original procedure. As a specific date for entry into force is not specified 
in the draft, pursuant to the standard Bulgarian rule on vacatio legis,4 its 
implementation should commence on the 3rd day after promulgation in 
the State Gazette.
The Ministry of Economy assumed primary responsibility for the 
legislative procedure. On 2 September 2016, the BAPCA was published 
4 Pursuant to Art. 5, Sec. 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria all statutory 
instruments enter into force upon the expiry of 3 days after their official publication, 
unless a different term is expressly specified therein.
Vlatka Butorac Malnar*
CROATIA
I. Manner of implementing the Directive
In Croatia, the Antitrust Damages Directive is about to be implemented 
via a special new Act on actions for damages arising out of antitrust 
infringements (hereinafter, draft Act on antitrust damages). Alternative 
implementing options, such as the full integration of the Directive into 
the Competition Act1 (hereinafter, CA), or the combined integration of 
the Directive into the Civil Procedure Act2 (hereinafter, CPA) and the 
Obligations Act3 (hereinafter, OA) was never seriously contemplated. The 
predominant view was that, in the light of the novelties to be introduced, 
a special act devoted to this particular subject matter would serve best the 
achievement of legal clarity, certainty and transparency. 
The entity responsible for drafting the Act on antitrust damages is 
the Ministry of Economy, Entrepreneurship and Crafts who authorized 
the Croatian Competition Agency (hereinafter, CCA) to establish and 
coordinate a working group for drafting the new Act. Currently, the draft 
Act on antitrust damages is being finalized, following a public consultation 
and the suggestions received from the EU Commission, and will soon be 
discussed in Parliament under the regular legislative procedure. Although 
the expedient legislative procedure would fast track the enactment of the 
* Assistant professor, Faculty of Law, University of Rijeka, Croatia; vlatka@pravri.hr. 
This paper was supported by the Croatian Science Foundation project No 9366 ‘Legal 
Aspects of Corporate Acquisitions and Knowledge Driven Companies’ Restructuring’. 
1 Official Gazette – Narodne novine 79/09, 80/13.
2 Civil Procedure Act, Official Gazette – Narodne novine 53/91, 91/92, 58/93, 112/99, 
88/01, 117/03, 88/05, 02/07, 84/08, 123/08, 57/11, 148/11, 25/13, 89/14.
3 Official Gazette – Narodne novine 35/05, 41/08, 125/11, 78/15.
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Act, the implementation of which was due already in December 2016, 
opting for a regular legislative procedure will enable the legislator to 
fine-tune the complex and novel legal rules on antitrust damages. This 
decision, however, comes at the expense of risking the commencement of 
an infringement procedure against Croatia before the EU Court on the 
ground of Article 258 TFEU.4 
Although the draft Act on antitrust damages for the first time elaborates 
in detail the legal framework for antitrust damages actions, it is worth 
mentioning these procedures were explicitly recognised already in the 
2013 CA. In fact, Article 69.a CA provides that undertakings who have 
infringed national or EU competition rules (Article 101 and 102 TFEU) 
are liable for compensation of damages thereby induced.5 Most procedural 
and substantive aspects of these procedures were left out of the CA (to be 
regulated by general tort and civil procedure rules contained respectively in 
the OA and CPA) albeit some important aspects of antitrust damages cases 
were addressed. The CA touched upon the role of infringement decisions 
in follow on cases; the suspension of proceedings, interruption of limitation 
periods; and the obligations of the commercial courts to inform the Croatian 
Competition Agency of any initiated antitrust damages cases.6 Since some 
4 The European Commission has already sent out an official warning to 21 out of the 
28 Member States for failing to transpose the Directive in due time including: Latvia, 
Spain, Estonia, the UK, Belgium, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Italy, 
Romania, Poland, Germany, France, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Austria, Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland and Croatia. See Crofts, 2017.
5 Article 69.a(2) CA. 
6 Article 69.a CA:
(1) The competent commercial courts shall decide on the claims for damages based on the 
infringements of this Act or Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU. 
(2) The undertakings who have infringed the provisions of this Act or Article 101 or 102 
of the TFEU shall be responsible for the compensation for damages resulting from the 
infringements concerned. 
(3) When deciding on the compensation for damages referred to in paragraph (1) of this 
Article the competent commercial court shall particularly take into account the legally 
valid decision of the Agency on the basis of which an infringement of this Act or Article 
101 or 102 of the TFEU has been established or the final decision of the European 
Commission in the case where the European Commission established the infringement of 
Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU. This is without prejudice to the rights and obligations 
under Article 267 of the TFEU.
(4) Where case relating to the establishment of the infringement of Article 101 or 102 of 
the TFEU is being dealt by the Agency or the European Commission, the competent 
commercial court may assess whether it is necessary to stay in its proceedings or to 
suspend the proceedings until the legally valid decision of the Agency or the final 
decision of the European Commission is made.
Michal Petr* 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
I. Introduction
In the Czech Republic, experience with private enforcement of 
competition law is very limited. Concerning court practice, a recently 
published study, the only one of its kind, was able to identify less than 
25 cases in the last 15 years, even though the number of judgements and 
decisions adopted in such cases exceeded 70. This suggests the extreme 
instability of jurisprudence, as most of the judgements of lower courts 
were (repeatedly) overturned on appeal. Damages were claimed only in 
a third of these cases, but the claimant has never been successful, as all 
these cases were settled or dismissed (Petr and Zorková, 2016, p. I–VIII).
Private enforcement, and claims for damages in particular, is therefore 
a  purely theoretical topic in the Czech Republic; at the same time, it is 
not widely discussed in academia either. In connection with the Czech EU 
Presidency in 2009, a conference was organised by the Charles University in 
Prague that discussed the White Paper and the first draft of the Damages 
Directive (Basedow, Terhechte and Tichý, 2011). Subsequently, claims for 
damages have been addressed only by a single monograph (Pipková, 2014) and 
in international publications comparing the regulation of private enforcement 
in different EU jurisdictions (Blanke and Nazzini, 2012; Bándi, Darák, Láncos 
and Tóth, 2016).
Not even the transposition of the Damages Directive stimulated a relevant 
debate, as will be described below. The author is not aware of any conference 
specifically addressing this topic or any publication dedicated to it. 
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II. Implementation of the Directive
By mid-March 2017, the Damages Directive has not been implemented 
in the Czech Republic yet. The proposal for an Act on Compensating 
Damages in the Area of Competition Law (hereinafter, ‘Damages Act’)1 was 
adopted by the Government and submitted to the Parliament in December 
2016. It has not yet passed the first, out of three readings in the Lower 
Chamber of the Parliament, which is to be followed by a discussion in 
the Senate. Even though the Government asked the Lower Chamber to 
adopt the Damages Act already in the first reading, without any substantive 
discussion, it cannot be realistically expected that the Damages Act will 
come into force before July 2017. All the observations in this Article are, 
therefore, unfortunately based on a legislative proposal, the final version 
of which is not yet known.
It was the duty of the Czech Competition Authority – the Office for 
the Protection of Competition (hereinafter, ‘CCA’), in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Justice, to submit the draft Damages Act to the Government.
The first issue concerning the implementation of the Damages Directive 
concerned whether it should take place by way of a new law or by way of 
an amendment of existing ones. It needs to be observed that Czech civil 
law was fully re-codified in 2012, when the completely new Civil Code 
was adopted,2 replacing its over 60 years old predecessor. The Ministry 
of Justice, generally responsible for civil law regulations, was therefore 
absolutely opposed to any amendments of the new Civil Code and suggested 
that the implementation of the Damages Directive shall be contained in 
the Competition Act.3 This, in turn, was strongly opposed by the CCA, 
which claimed that the Competition Act is a public law regulation, whereas 
private enforcement is exclusively concerned with private law. As a matter 
of compromise, it was agreed that a new, self-standing act shall be adopted 
for the purposes of implementing the Damages Directive, amending, if 
necessary, the Competition Act.
The second issue concerned the level of detail of the implementation. 
The CCA unveiled its first draft of the Damages Act in March 2016 for 
comments from other governmental bodies.4 The original draft was totally 
1 Proposal of the Damages Act is accessible (in Czech) at: http://www.psp.cz/sqw/text/
tiskt.sqw?O=7&CT=991&CT1=0 (13.03.2017). 
2 Act No. 98/2012 Coll., Civil Code.
3 Act. No. 143/2001 Coll., on the protection of competition, as amended.
4 This first draft is accessible (in Czech) at: https://apps.odok.cz/veklep-history-
version?pid=KORNA7XBHCNY (13.03.2017).
Evelin Pärn-Lee*
ESTONIA
I. Introduction
The Directive 2014/104/EU (hereinafter, Directive) has not been 
implemented in Estonia yet, and will most probably not be transposed 
before mid-2017. Estonia has therefore not been able to meet the deadline 
set out in Article 21(1) of the Directive, that is, to implement the Directive 
by 27 December 2016. The officials of the Ministry of Justice1 have prepared 
relevant legal acts and submitted them to the Parliament for a final reading2 
and, ultimately, adoption.
Comments made in this submission are based on the Draft Law as 
it stands on 24 February 2017 (hereinafter, Draft Law). It may happen, 
however, that the Draft Law is subject to further changes during its reading 
in the Parliament.
* Junior researcher and PhD student at Tallinn Technical University (TUT); lecturer 
in EU competition law and policy at TUT for over 10 years and a visiting lecturer at 
the Tartu University (Estonia) since 2015. Apart from academic work, over 15 years 
of international consultancy experience as an attorney at law, and before commencing 
the PhD course in 2016, head of the legal department of Enterprise Estonia training 
officials on EU state aid rules as well as leading the team in solving major illegal state 
aid cases; evelinparnlee@gmail.com. 
1 In charge of the harmonisation.
2 The Estonian law-making process foresees three readings in the Parliament.
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II. Manner of implementing the Directive in Estonia
Estonian law makers have chosen to implement the rules and regulations 
set forth in the Directive by amending the Competition Act3 (hereinafter, 
CA), the Code of Civil Procedure4 (hereinafter, COCP) and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure5 (hereinafter, CCP), no separate legal act will thus be 
adopted. Even though many of the principles referred to in the Directive 
already exist in Estonian legislation, some of its terms and rules are not 
provided by the national legal system, such as direct or indirect supplier or 
customer and the passing-on of overcharges.6 These are either defined in 
the Draft Law or respectively explained in the explanatory notes attached 
to it. New and additional rules have been created or clarifications provided 
in the explanatory notes attached to the Draft Law with regard to joint 
and several liability as well as entering consensual settlements between 
the victim and the person causing damages. Limitation of liability receives 
special attention, as this has proven to be a problem in earlier relevant 
damages cases. Special rules have been created with regard to evidence 
collection in civil procedure and access to the file. Relevant changes have 
also been made concerning the Estonian competition authority – the 
Competition Board. First, its decisions will become binding on civil courts, 
and second, it will regain the right to perform administrative supervision, 
performed subject to the economic unit principle, over the activities of state 
or local government. No changes are foreseen regarding competent courts 
or dispute resolution. What is interesting to note, though, is the treatment 
of business secrets or otherwise confidential information. According to the 
Directive, such information must, on the one hand, be available in actions 
for damages but on the other, it needs to be appropriately protected. It 
is generally accepted that the Estonian legal system is lacking appropriate 
protective measures in this context. For these purposes, the makers of the 
Draft Law originally proposed a system of so-called confidentiality clubs/
3 In Estonian: Konkurentsiseadus, passed on 5.06.2001, entry into force on 1.10.2001. English 
version available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/Riigikogu/act/519012015013/
consolide (4.03.2017).
4 In Estonian: Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik, passed on 20.04.2005, entry into force on 
1.01.2006. English version available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/Riigikogu/
act/504072016003/consolide (4.03.2017).
5 In Estonian: Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik, passed on 12.02.2003, entry into force on 
1.07.2004. English version available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/Riigikogu/
act/531052016002/consolide (4.03.2017).
6 Although the principle as such is provided in civil procedural law.
Peter Miskolczi Bodnár*
HUNGARY
I. Manner of implementing the Directive
1. General state of national law on damages
Some elements of Hungarian law were already consistent with the 
standards established by the European Parliament and Council Directive 
2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions issued on 26 November 2014 
(hereinafter, Directive). 
1.1. Possibility of private enforcement
Private enforcement was theoretically possible in Hungary from the 
moment when anticompetitive agreements and the abuse of a dominant 
position became prohibited by the Hungarian Competition Act. This 
possibility was not originally based on competition law provisions. Instead, 
it was introduced by Hungarian Private Law which established the right 
for compensatory damages as a general right,1 without further specifying 
the types of different illegal behaviours.2 The notion of damages includes 
* Professor of Law at the Károli Gáspár University of Reformed Church, Budapest, head 
of Department on Commercial Law, former member of the Competition Council of 
the Hungarian Competition Authority; miskolczi.bodnar.peter@kre.hu.
1 Proving culpability is a crucial part of the litigation. However, the burden of proof is 
not on the plaintiff, but on the party having caused the damage. The defendant has the 
possibility to prove that (s)he has not failed to meet the standards of behaviour that 
would generally be expected in the given situation.
2 ‘Anyone causing damages to another person by infringement of law shall compensate 
therefor. He is exempted from liability if he proves that he behaved as it is generally 
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both damnum emergens and lucrum cessans but punitive damages cannot be 
imposed. The theoretical possibility of private enforcement was concretised 
later by the Competition Act. Concerning the breach of Article 81 and 82 
of the Rome Treaty, the possibility of private enforcement was declared by 
a 2003 amendment of the Competition Act3 (which entered into force on the 
1 May 2004). The possibility of civil law actions for damages on the basis 
of a breach of Hungarian competition law provisions on anticompetitive 
agreements and abuse of dominance was directly ensured by an amendment 
of the Competition Act in 2005.4 Hungarian law has also recognised the 
possibility of both follow-on and stand-alone private actions for damages.5
While the courts were authorised to award damages in cases where 
an anticompetitive agreement or an abuse of a dominant position caused 
damages, there was a short period of time when Hungarian courts had no 
jurisdiction to decide on the lawfulness of the behaviour in question. The 
Hungarian Competition Authority (hereinafter, HCA) was the competent 
authority in this matter.6 This situation has changed in the meantime. 
Hungarian courts are authorised to decide on the legality of the contested 
behaviour on the basis of European and/or Hungarian Competition Law 
since 1 November 2005. In practice, however, even until now such a decision 
is usually made by the HCA and has binding effect (see below in point 1.4.).
Not only did Hungarian law offer compensatory damages for competition 
law infringement even before adopting the Green Paper7 and the White 
expected in the given situation’ – Article 6:579 of the Civil Code establishes the general 
rule of liability in damages caused outside contractual relations.
3 Act No LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices 
covers unfair competition and antitrust law and contains relevant procedural rules as 
well. The competence for these matters is separated. Unfair competition cases belong 
to the competence of regular civil courts; antitrust cases belong to the competence of 
the Hungarian Competition Authority.
4 In 2005, a new Article 88/A was introduced into the Hungarian Competition Act which 
provided that ‘the power of the Hungarian Competition Authority to proceed (...) and 
used to safeguard (...) the public interest, shall not prevent civil law claims, arising 
out of the infringement of the provisions (...) [on the unfair manipulation of business 
decisions, cartels and abuse of dominant position], from being enforced directly in 
court.’ (Act LXVIII of 2005 entered into effect on 1 November 2005).
5 Stand-alone private actions for damages were mentioned in the Competition Act for 
the first time as a result of its modification in 2005.
6 See case Hungarian Supreme Court (Legfelsőbb Bíróság) Pf. IV 2000 24.909/2000/1 
(BH 2004 151).
7 Green Paper of 19.12.2005, COM 672.
Julija Jerneva* and Inese Druviete** 
LATVIA
I. Manner of implementing the Directive
As of the date of this publication,1 Latvia has only implemented the 
provisions of Article 17(2) of the Directive.2 Even though the transposition 
was due by 27 December 2016, the rest of the provisions of the Directive 
remain not transposed into the Latvian legal system. 
The relevant legal acts which specify the procedure for damages actions 
are the Latvian Competition Law (hereinafter, Competition Law) and the 
Latvian Civil Procedure Law3 (hereinafter, CPL). Therefore, the Ministry 
of Economics has drafted new amendments to the Competition Law4 
(hereinafter, Draft Competition Law) as well as amendments to the CPL5 
(hereinafter, Draft CPL and collectively referred to as the Amendments). 
The Amendments were not, however, submitted to the Latvian Parliament 
(in Latvian: Saeima). As a result, the Amendments are not expected to 
be passed until autumn 2017, unless an expedited procedure is chosen. 
* PhD cand.; attorney-at-law, partner at VILGERTS law firm, specialising in EU and 
competition law; visiting lecturer in Riga Graduate School of Law, Latvia; Julija.
Jerneva@vilgerts.com. 
** Docent and Bachelor Programme Director at Riga Graduate School of Law, Latvia; 
inese.druviete@rgsl.edu.lv.
1 13.03.2017.
2 The latest amendments to the Latvian Competition Law (in Latvian: Konkurences likums), 
which implemented the Damages Directive in relation to the provisions of its Art. 17(2), 
were initiated on 25.05.2015 (preparation of the draft).
3 In Latvian: Civilprocesa likums.
4 Draft law No VSS-441, approved by the Meeting of State Secretaries on 8.09.2016.
5 Draft law No VSS-866, approved by the Meeting of State Secretaries on 8.09.2016.
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Furthermore, given that historically amendments to the Competition Law 
attract the attention of many stakeholders, the debates in the Parliament 
are expected to last at least one-two months between each reading (the 
laws are normally passed in three readings), which may delay the adoption 
of the Amendments even further.
The Amendments are supplemented with an Annotation which explains 
the reasoning behind the Amendments and describes the intended 
application and interpretation thereof (hereinafter, Annotation).6 The 
Amendments aspire to transpose the provisions of the Directive through 
amendments to six provisions of the Competition Law and seven provisions 
of the CPL. 
II. Scope of the implementation
Latvia seems to have opted for the implementation of the entire scope 
of the Directive. The Draft Competition Law does not, however, go 
significantly beyond the clear requirements of the Directive. 
First, the Amendments provide claimants with the right to claim full 
compensation (that is, compensation for actual loss, loss of profit, and 
payment of interest from the day when the harm occurred until the day 
when compensation is paid). By so doing, claimants are to be placed in the 
position in which they would have been had the infringement of competition 
law not been committed.7 
Second, the Directive refers to ‘infringements of the competition law 
provisions’, but the provisions of the Directive are initially drafted to 
address the consequences of infringements of Article 101 or 102 TFEU 
or of respective national competition law provisions.8 Neither the Directive 
nor the Draft Competition Law address the issue of compensation for harm 
caused by a failure to comply with other competition law provisions. Latvian 
law will go further and include a more general reference to a violation 
6 Annotations, according to Latvian law, must always accompany draft laws and give 
reasons for the amendments to the relevant law, its intended application, and other 
relevant considerations. Annotations are customarily used by authorities and courts in 
order to clarify the intention of the legislature.
7 Part 2 of Art. 21 of the Draft Competition Law.
8 Art. 2(3) of the Directive provides that ‘national competition law means provisions 
of national law that predominantly pursue the same objective as Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU and that are applied to the same case and in parallel to Union competition law 
(…)’.
Valentinas Mikelėnas* and Rasa Zaščiurinskaitė**
LITHUANIA 
I. Private enforcement in Lithuania before the implementation: status quo
Lithuanian law was familiar with private enforcement of competition 
law already before Lithuania’s entry into the European Union in the year 
2004. Private enforcement was governed by the Law on Competition of 
Lithuania (hereinafter, Law on Competition),1 the Civil Code of Lithuania 
(hereinafter, Civil Code)2 and the Code of Civil Procedure of Lithuania 
(hereinafter, Code of Civil Procedure).3
Specifically, the Law on Competition, adopted in 1999, established 
a general right for injured persons to bring a damages compensation claim 
before national court. However, before Lithuania’s entry into the European 
* Habil. dr., Professor at Vilnius University, Faculty of Law, Department of Private Law; 
partner at Law Firm TGS BALTIC; former Legal Advisor of the Law Department 
of the Parliament of Lithuania (Seimas) and former Judge of the Supreme Court of 
Lithuania; served as a member of the Working Group for the preparation of the draft 
Law on Competition of Lithuania implementing the Damages Directive, head of the 
Working Group for the preparation of the Civil Code of Lithuania, senior advisor of 
the Working Group for the preparation of the Code of Civil Procedure of Lithuania, 
member of more than 10 working groups for the preparation of various draft Laws 
(including but not limited to the Law on Commercial Arbitration). E-mail: valentinas.
mikelenas@tf.vu.lt. 
** Attorney specialized in EU and national competition law having litigation experience 
in most of private antitrust enforcement cases in Lithuania, associate partner at Law 
Firm TGS BALTIC; actively participates as a contributor in conferences related to EU 
and national competition law including private enforcement.
1 23.03.1999, No VIII-1099 (O.G., 1999, No. 30-856; 2012, No. 42-2041) (with subsequent 
amendments).
2 18.07.2000, No VIII-1864 (O.G. 2000, No. 74-2262) (with subsequent amendments).
3 28.02.2002, No IX-743 (O.G. 2002, No. 36-1340) (with subsequent amendments).
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Union, this right was limited only to those undertakings which were harmed 
by a competition law infringement. 
Furthermore, the Civil Code, effective from 1 July 2001, established 
the principle of general delict (Article 6.263 of the Civil Code). In order 
to establish grounds for damages compensation, four cumulative elements 
of civil liability have to be established: (i) unlawfulness (infringement of 
competition law); (ii) damage; (iii) causal link between the infringement 
and the damage and; (iv) fault (rebuttable presumption applies) (Articles 
6.246–6.248 of the Civil Code). Following the Civil Code, the court shall 
estimate the quantum of damages in case the claimant cannot prove their 
precise amount (Article 6.249(1) of the Civil Code). The Civil Code also 
established the principle of full compensation of damages (restitutio in 
integrum) (Article 6.263(2) of the Civil Code). Hence those, and certain 
other provisions equivalent to respective provisions under the Damages 
Directive, have already been introduced into Lithuanian law since 2001. 
In addition, agreements infringing competition law can be declared null 
and void by a court based on the norms of the Civil Code, whereas the 
Law on Competition also empowered courts to terminate the violation of 
competition law based on the claim of the injured person.4
Following the Code of Civil Procedure, the burden of proof of civil 
liability for the infringement of competition law was placed on the claimant 
(except for the fault which is presumed). While the Code on Civil Procedure 
does not define the standard of proof, it is generally accepted that a claim 
is proven if there are no reasonable doubts as to whether the available 
evidence is substantial, relevant or admissible. Such evidence must point to 
a reasonable conclusion of the existence of the circumstances in question 
(Laužikas, Mikelėnas and Nekrošius, 2003, p. 4165). Since 1 January 2015, 
new and more detailed rules related to collective redress under the Code 
of Civil Procedure came into effect following the European Commission 
Recommendation on Collective Redress adopted in 2013.6 
Therefore, a certain legal framework and tools, both of substantive and 
procedural law, existed that applied to private enforcement in Lithuania 
before the implementation of the Damages Directive. However, private 
antitrust enforcement in Lithuania remains quite rare. There have only 
been up to 10 private enforcement cases since 2003 (both standalone and 
4 However, this national report shall concentrate on antitrust damages claims only.
5 In Lithuanian.
6 Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective 
redress mechanisms concerning violations of rights granted under Union law, OJ L 201, 
26.07.2013, p. 60. 
Anna Piszcz* and Dominik Wolski**
POLAND
I. Manner of implementing the Directive
First, this report narrates the history of the works on the harmonisation 
of private antitrust enforcement in Poland, which commenced in 2015. The 
starting point for the works on the implementing Act was the formulation 
of the Assumptions behind the draft Act (hereinafter, Assumptions), a draft 
discussion paper on the proposed legal rules which, according to Polish 
law, must precede the actual draft Act. The first draft of the Assumptions 
was published in early December 2015 on the website of the Civil Law 
Codification Commission at the Ministry of Justice (hereinafter, CLCC).1 
However, the members of the CLCC were dismissed mid-December 2015 
and the Minister of Justice announced plans to create a new Codification 
Commission of the Republic of Poland. After the dissolution of the CLCC, 
the Ministry of Justice continued the works on the implementation of 
the Damages Directive. The draft Assumptions, somewhat changed by the 
Ministry, were published and submitted for public consultation in March 
2016. The Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers approved their 
* Dr. Hab. in law, Professor at the University of Białystok, Faculty of Law, Department of 
Public Economic Law; piszcz@uwb.edu.pl. Sections I, II, III, V.1, V.3, V.4 and VI were 
written by Anna Piszcz, whilst Section VII is a common part.
** PhD in law, attorney-at-law, member of the Centre of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies at 
the Faculty of Management, University of Warsaw, assistant professor at Katowice School of 
Economics; dominik.wolski@wolski-legal.com. Sections IV and V.2 were written by Dominik 
Wolski whilst Section VII is a common part.
1 In Polish available at: https://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/komisje-kodyfikacyjne/komisja-
kodyfikacyjna-prawa-cywilnego/ (all Internet references in this article were last visited on 
9.03.2017).
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final version in June 2016,2 and instructed the Minister of Justice to draft the 
Act. The Assumptions were the baseline for the works on the draft Act. The 
draft Act, named the draft Act on Claims for Damages for Infringements 
of Competition Law (hereinafter, ACD), was published and submitted for 
public consultation in November 2016.3 It was subsequently approved by 
the Council of Ministers and sent to the lower chamber of the Parliament 
(Sejm) on 8 March 2017. The ACD is at the moment (9  March 2017) 
going through the consecutive steps of the Polish legislative process in 
the Parliament. In this phase, it will be read three times in the Sejm; the 
adopted Act will then be examined by the higher chamber of the Polish 
Parliament (Senat), followed by another vote in the Sejm on the resolution of 
the Senat. If the Act is ultimately adopted by the Sejm, it will subsequently 
be sent to the President of the Republic of Poland for signing. If the Polish 
President signs it, the Act will be published in the Journal of Laws. It seems, 
therefore, that there is still a long way to go from where Polish legislative 
works currently are, to the actual implementation of the Directive.
The ACD consists of 39 articles. The first 31 articles set out the rules 
governing claims and actions for damages under national law for competition 
law infringements – both rules required by the Damages Directive and some 
additional ones. Next, the ACD is going to amend the general provision of 
the Civil Code4 relating to the limitation period for tort-based compensation 
claims. The ACD is also going to amend the 1993 Act on combating unfair 
competition,5 so as to avoid possible overlaps and/or a conjunction of rules. 
In addition, the ACD is going to contribute to the 2007 Act on Competition 
and Consumer Protection6 so as to protect the files of the Polish competition 
authority7 in accordance with the requirements of the Damages Directive. 
The final part of the ACD contains relevant transitional provisions and 
a rule on the entry into force of its provisions, namely the 14-day period 
after its publication when its applicability is suspended (vacatio legis). 
2 In Polish at: https://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/projekt/12283303.
3 In Polish at: https://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/projekt/12292051.
4 The 1964 Civil Code (Kodeks cywilny), consolidated version Journal of Laws 2016 item 380 
as amended.
5 Consolidated version Journal of Laws 2003 No. 153, item 1503 as amended.
6 Consolidated version Journal of Laws 2017 item 229.
7 The President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, in Polish Prezes Urzędu 
Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów, hereinafter also as the UOKiK President.
Valentin Mircea* 
ROMANIA
I. Manner of implementing the Directive
Since the enactment of the first Romanian competition law (Law 
21/1996), this contained a specific provision stressing the right of victims 
of competition law infringements to obtain compensation for the damages 
which they have incurred. ‘Apart from the sanctions applied in accordance with 
this law, the right of a physical and legal persons to obtain full compensation 
for the damages created through an anticompetitive act prohibited by this law 
remains reserved’.
This rule, which merely re-states the principle of torts liability, was 
supplemented in 2010 and 2011 with several specific provisions, aimed at 
creating a specific framework for the private enforcement of competition 
rules. The new provisions regarded: passing-on of overcharges; statute of 
limitation; standing of consumer associations in actions for damages; access 
to the file of the competition authority; and single (instead of joint and 
several) liability of leniency applicants. These provisions were inspired 
by the debates and the works of the European Commission,1 since the 
European Court of Justice gave force to the right to compensation of private 
victims of antitrust infringements. At the time of its enactment, the legal 
framework provided by Romanian law was among the most advanced in 
the European Union. Private litigation cases started to appear after 2011, 
* Valentin Mircea is the former Vice-President of the Romanian competition authority 
and holds a PhD from the University of Bucharest (2014) with a thesis on actions 
for the recovery of damages arising from infringements of competition rules. He is 
currently pursuing advanced studies in international competition law at the University 
of Melbourne; e-mail: valentinmircea73@gmail.com. 
1 The ‘Green Paper’ of 2005 and the ‘White Paper’ which followed in 2008. 
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although most ended up being finalized with out-of-court settlements. Up 
to now, there is only one case, decided by the Bucharest Court of Appeal, 
in which a private plaintiff obtained the recovery of damages from a state-
owned former monopoly. The latter was previously found to have abused its 
position in the market for postal deliveries by the Romanian Competition 
Council.2 The decision of the Court of Appeal is currently under review 
by the High Court of Justice.3 
The draft recently presented by the Romanian government differs from 
the Draft Law which was circulated with the stakeholders and submitted 
to public consultations in the second half of 2016. The intention seems 
to be at the moment to implement Directive4 through an emergency 
government ordinance (hereinafter, EGO), since the implementation 
deadline had already passed and the European Commission initiated formal 
infringement procedures against Romania. It has to be said, however, that 
the implementation of the Directive does not qualify, as a matter of principle, 
for the use of a legal instrument such as an EGO. For this reason, this 
report will refer to the Draft Law rather than the draft EGO. If adopted 
through an EGO, the legal provisions implementing the Directive may be 
subject to a significant review in the Parliament, which will be eventually 
called to approve the EGO, with any amendments it may deem necessary. 
II. Competent courts
De lege lata, actions for the recovery of damages caused by competition 
law infringements may be brought before the lower courts (‘judecătorie’). 
This is not the most favourable situation, given the relative lack of experience 
of judges of the lower courts, and the complex technical aspects often 
emerging in actions for damages based on competition law infringements. 
The Draft Law which is currently proposed by the government of Romania, 
proposes to assign first-instance competences to decide on such cases solely 
to the Bucharest Tribunal, the latter being a higher court with judges 
2 The decision, in Romanian, may be found at: http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/
docs/items/id2940/decizia_nr52_din_16122010_publicare.pdf
3 Details available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/antitrust/nationalcourts/?ms_
code=rom
4 Reference to the ‘Directive’ means throughout this text, to Directive 2014/104/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition 
law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union.
Ondrej Blažo* 
SLOVAKIA
I. Manner of implementing the Directive
1. Early-history of private enforcement in Slovakia
The implementation of the Damages Directive is not the first attempt to 
regulate procedural or substantive rules that can, at least partially, fall within 
the concept of private enforcement of competition law. The original text of 
Article 42 of Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Economic Competition 
and Amending Act of the Slovak National Council No. 347/1990 Coll. on 
Organization of Ministries and Other Central Bodies of State Administration 
of the Slovak Republic as Amended (hereinafter, APEC) stipulated that 
‘consumers, whose rights were violated by a  prohibited restriction of 
competition, can submit a claim to the court for the infringer to cease 
such behaviour and repair the illegal state. A legal person empowered 
to protect consumer rights can lodge the same claim’. The title of this 
provision was quite misleading: ‘Civil Disputes from Prohibited Restrictions 
of Competition’. Reading the title of the said provision literally could have 
led to the argument that Article 42 APEC represents numerus clausus 
of possible civil claims. Furthermore, this provision referred to ‘civil 
law disputes’ and, due to the dichotomy of Slovak civil law, to civil law 
stricto sensu centred on the Civil Code (Občiansky zákonník), as well as to 
commercial law governed primarily by the Commercial Code (Obchodný 
zákonník). Hence, it was not clear to which claims it referred to.
* JUDr. Ing., PhD., Comenius University in Bratislava, Faculty of Law, Institute of 
European Law; ondrej.blazo@flaw.uniba.sk. Paper was prepared within the grant project 
APVV-0158-12 ‘Efektívnosť právnej úpravy ochrany hospodárskej súťaže v kontexte jej 
aplikácie v praxi’.
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Currently, there is no doubt that damages caused by competition 
infringements are covered by the rules of the Commercial Code1 – 
particularly its Article 373 et seq. – irrespective of whether the injured 
party is an undertaking or not. Compared to rules on liability for damages 
under the Civil Code2 (general system), liability under the Commercial 
Code is based on principles of strict liability. Therefore, the real purpose of 
the provision of Article 42 APEC became unclear due to its quite limited 
content (a form of injunction and restitutio in integrum order) without 
any reference to damages claims. A possible involvement of consumer 
associations, as actively legitimated claimants, represents, therefore, the 
only measure different from those enshrined in the Commercial Code 
and reflects the first form of possible collective redress. Nevertheless, this 
provision has never been used as the basis for a successful court dispute, 
and there is no final meritorious judgment dealing with a case under the 
previous wording of Article 42 APEC.
2. Awaiting the Damages Directive
By Amendment 2014 of the APEC,3 the provision of Article 42 was 
completely replaced by a new provision regarding liability for damages 
caused by a competition law infringement. This regulation was introduced 
while the Damages Directive was being drafted, thus inspiration by the draft 
of the Directive is evident. Amendment 2014 laid down a specific regime, 
and a modification of joint and several liability of leniency applicants was 
introduced:
– a party to the competition restricting agreement which fulfilled the con-
ditions for the participation in the leniency programme is not obliged 
to pay damages if the damages could be paid by other parties of the 
same competition restricting agreement;
– a party to the competition restricting agreement which fulfilled the con-
ditions for the participation in the leniency programme is excluded from 
the obligation to settle with those other participants of the competition 
restricting agreement which paid damages;
1 Act No. 513/1991 Coll. Commercial Code as amended.
2 Act No. 40/1964 Coll. Civil Code as amended.
3 Act No. 151/2014 Coll. amending act No. 136/2001 Coll. on protection of economic 
competition and amending act of the Slovak National Council No 347/1990 Coll. on 
organization of ministries of other central bodies of state administration of the Slovak 
Republic as amended as amended and amending certain other acts.
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I. Introduction
This national report aims to present the regime of private antitrust 
enforcement in the Republic of Slovenia before and after the implementation 
of the new Directive 2014/104 on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union that was to be implemented 
by the Member States by 27 December 2016.1 Individual provisions of the 
directive and their corresponding provisions in Slovenian (draft) legislation 
will be analysed testing thereby whether a correct, coherent and substantively 
adequate transfer of the directive into Slovenian law has been made. The 
report will assess both currently valid as well as planned provisions of the 
relevant legislation through the lens of the new directive. An in-depth 
analysis of the focal issues of the final proposal of amendments to the 
Slovenian Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act will be provided, 
revealing the most problematic issues of the new regime and dilemmas 
that have arisen in transposing the directive into the Slovenian system of 
civil law.2 
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1 OJ EU L 349, 5.12.2014.
2 The report is based on the following articles and monographs (or parts within): Fatur, 
Podobnik and Vlahek, 2016; Vlahek, 2016b, p. 547–590, 620–621; Vlahek, 2016a, p. 375–428; 
Vlahek and Lutman, 2017, p. 41–70, 135–136.
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II. Method of implementing the Directive
In Slovenia, the directive will be implemented by way of adopting 
a  law amending the existent Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act 
(Sl. Zakon o preprečevanju omejevanja konkurence, hereinafter, ZPOmK-1) 
of 2008.3 This will be the ninth amendment to the ZPOmK-14 and it will 
take the form of a new Act Amending and Supplementing the Prevention 
of Restriction of Competition Act (Sl. Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah 
Zakona o preprečevanju omejevanja konkurence, hereinafter, ZPOmK-1G)). 
The focal part of the amending act comprises of a new Part VI titled ‘Certain 
rules of private enforcement of breaches of competition law’ encompassing 
Articles 62 and 62a – 62o that will be inserted into the ZPOmK-1 replacing 
the existent Part VI titled ‘Court Proceedings’ and its Article 62. 
The implementation process of the directive in Slovenia is in its 
final stage. A final draft proposal of the implementation provisions of 
16 November 20165 was being refined by the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Technology (Directorate for Internal Market, Sector for 
the Protection of Consumers and Competition) until the end of February 
2017, after it received comments to various draft proposals of 2016 by the 
European Commission and the interested stakeholders in Slovenia, i.e. 
the industry, law professors, judges, the Slovenian Bar Association, the 
Slovenian Competition Protection Agency, the Ministry of Justice et al. The 
official public consultation on the ZPOmK-1G took place between 15 June 
2016 and 15 July 2016 after the first draft proposal of 6 June 2016 was 
published on the web pages of the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Technology6 and on the e-governance web pages.7 After receiving initial 
comments to the first draft proposal, the ministry started refining the text 
of the ZPOmK-1G and forwarded a new version of the text to all those 
who had submitted comments to the first draft proposal of 6 June 2016. 
On 5 September 2016, a public consultation on the ZPOmK-1G addressing 
the issues of private enforcement and the implementation of the directive 
was held at the Ministry. On the basis of the comments received there, 
3 Official Gazette  RS, Nos. 36/08, 40/09, 26/11, 87/11, 57/12, 39/13 (Constitutional Court’s 
decision), 63/13, 33/14 and 76/15. The ZPOmK-1 entered into force on 26.04.2008.
4 For a historical background of Slovenian competition law and the substance of the 
amendments to the ZPOmK-1, see Fatur, Podobnik and Vlahek, 2016, p. 27–32.
5 EVA 2016-2130-0075. Not available online.
6 Available in Slovene only: <http://www.mgrt.gov.si/si/zakonodaja_in_dokumenti/notranji_
trg/predlogi_predpisov/sektor_za_varstvo_potrosnikov_in_konkurence/> (5.03.2017).
7 <https://e-uprava.gov.si/drzava-in-druzba/e-demokracija.html> (6.03.2017).
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Quo vadis CEE? Summary
I. Introductory remarks
The Latin phrase Quo vadis in the title of this summary is, unsurprisingly, 
intended to reflect the question of where we, Central and Eastern Europe, 
are going regarding the implementation of the EU Damages Directive. 
More precisely even, whether the ‘routes’ taken by the legal drafters and/
or legislatures of CEE countries implementing the EU Damages Directive 
correspond very closely to the model provided by the Directive or, to the 
contrary, are the CEE legislatures and/or drafters using the opportunities to 
do something different than only to copy and paste the Directive. Are the 
already existing provisions, plus the newly introduced ones, compliant with 
the Directive? If yes, further amendments to national legal frameworks are 
most probably not necessary at this stage at all, or maybe it is necessary 
to introduce only a few amendments. If not, what further improvements 
are necessary? 
II. Status quo of the works on the implementation
The national reports narrated, first of all, the history of the works on 
the implementation of the EU Damages Directive in CEE countries. It 
is a truth acknowledged by the Authors that as of early March 2017, only 
three out of the eleven CEE countries (Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia) 
had national provisions transposing the EU Damages Directive into their 
* Dr. Hab. in law, Professor at the University of Białystok, Faculty of Law, Department 
of Public Economic Law; piszcz@uwb.edu.pl. 
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laws already in force. At that time, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia were all still awaiting the 
transposition of the Directive. Irrespective of how remote the time of the 
transposition is, the majority of the Authors had to use draft provisions 
as the basis for their national reports. The first chapters of the national 
reports answered therefore not the question of ‘where we go’ but rather, 
the question of ‘how we go’. The answer is certainly, ‘too slowly’. 
III. Scope of the implementation
In subsequent chapters of the national reports, the Authors paid close 
attention to the scope of the implementation of the Directive, which is 
quintessential from the perspective of the question asked in the title of 
this summary. First, it seemed common knowledge that it would not be 
reasonable for Member States to have double standards with respect to 
the two different types of infringements – prohibited practices with and 
without EU effect. As expected, the national reports say that, reasonably, 
all the CEE countries chose to broaden the scope of the implementation 
going beyond only infringements with EU effect. Did the EU use a back 
door wanting to harmonise also national legal frameworks governing actions 
for damages for infringements of the competition law provisions without 
EU effect? 
Second, the legal drafters and/or legislatures of CEE countries have not 
proven overly creative regarding the scope of the remedies to which the 
harmonised rules are going to be applied. All CEE countries are going 
to apply the harmonised rules only to claims for damages. Slovenia seems 
to be the only one that tried, at some stage of the legislative works, to 
broaden the scope of the implementing rules to all possible civil claims; 
however, the final draft has ultimately restricted their scope to claims for 
damages only. 
So if in those two areas the CEE countries chose ‘minimal’ implementation 
in line with the Damages Directive, what about the types of infringements to 
which the harmonised rules are going to be applied? In the majority of the 
CEE countries these cover only: (1) agreements, decisions by associations of 
undertakings or concerted practices and (2) abuses of a dominant position. 
But it is not the same with Latvia, Hungary and Bulgaria. The new Latvian 
law is going to be expanded to include also unfair competition practices. 
Since Latvian Competition Law prohibits also unfair competition practices 
and the new provisions are going to contain a more general reference to 
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violations of any provision of the said Latvian statute, the implemented 
provisions will be broadened to encompass also unfair competition practices. 
Interestingly, the approach to this question in Bulgaria and Hungary is a bit 
different. In Bulgaria, the broadened implementation with regard to unfair 
competition practices is going to regard only the right to full compensation. 
In Hungary, some of the new rules (Chapter XIV/B of the Competition 
Act) relate to a very specific type of prohibited practices, that is the unfair 
manipulation of business decisions. 
As to the personal scope of the implementation of the Directive, the 
CEE countries chose ‘minimal’ implementation in line with the Damages 
Directive. They have never followed one pattern as regards the liability 
of a parent company for infringements of competition law committed by 
a  subsidiary. The concept of a ‘single economic entity’ has been defined 
in legal provisions (Croatia) or adopted in jurisprudence (Bulgaria and 
Slovenia). In some CEE countries, legislation provides for the liability of 
a parent company for the obligations of its subsidiaries – public (Hungary) 
or private (Lithuania). The ‘own fault’ of a parent company is assessed, 
for example whether it gave instruction to a subsidiary (Croatia, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania). In some countries however, there is only the concept of a ‘single 
legal entity’, rather than the concept of a ‘single economic entity’ (Poland, 
Hungary). That might have been about to change. Passing legislation 
to regulate the civil liability of a parent company for competition law 
infringements of its subsidiaries would, without any doubt, be a move 
welcomed by scholars and practitioners. But, as the national reports say, 
this is not going to take place. 
IV. Competent courts
The national reports focus next on the issue of competent national courts 
before which the right to compensation is enforced. The Directive does 
not provide for any specific organizational model of private enforcement of 
competition law. Therefore, Member States have plenty of options. Some 
CEE countries are going to be characterised by having only one court 
competent to hear actions for antitrust damages. These include Lithuania 
(Vilnius Regional Court as the court of 1st instance and the Court of 
Appeal of Lithuania as the court of 2nd instance) and Latvia (Riga city 
Latgale district court as the court of 1st instance and Riga Regional court 
as the court of 2nd instance). Out of the three countries that implemented 
the Directive already (Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia), Slovakia decided 
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to have only one court competent to hear actions for antitrust damages 
(District Court Bratislava II as the court of 1st instance and the Regional 
Court in Bratislava as the court of 2nd instance). In Croatia, actions for 
antitrust damages are heard by specialised commercial courts. Some CEE 
countries are going to be characterised by the competence of regional 
courts irrespective of the amount of the claim (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Croatia). However, if we take a closer look at the composition of 
the judicial panel, it turns out that those cases are usually heard by a single 
judge only (Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Poland). In Bulgaria, general 
courts – district or provincial (regional) – are competent depending on 
the amount of the claim. Interestingly, Bulgarian courts limit their own 
competence and consider stand-alone actions inadmissible. Regrettably, 
in the majority of the CEE countries, courts described by the Authors as 
non-specialised remain competent to hear actions for antitrust damages. 
V. Substantive law issues
Further, the national reports contain an overview of relevant substantive 
law issues. 
Examined first in the national reports are developments of the rules 
governing limitation periods for bringing actions for antitrust damages. The 
new provisions or draft provisions correspond in principle to Article 10 of 
the Directive. It is interesting, however, that some countries have difficulties 
with the transposition of the conditions relating to the beginning of the 
limitation period. Namely, according to the Slovenian draft, the limitation 
period shall begin to run when, inter alia, the claimant knows, or can 
reasonably be expected to know, of the behaviour of the infringer constituting 
an infringement of competition law. By contrast, the Directive mentions 
‘the fact that the behaviour constitutes an infringement’ (Article 10(2)(a) of 
the Directive). Furthermore, the Slovenian draft requires that the claimant 
knows, or can reasonably be expected to know, of the harm caused by the 
infringement of competition law, while the Directive refers to ‘the fact 
that the infringement of competition law caused harm’ to the claimant 
(Article 10(2)(b) of the Directive). Second, the Hungarian provisions 
mention ‘damage caused by infringement’ rather than the content of the 
Directive. Third, the Czech draft mentions the person liable to pay the 
damages, where the Directive requires knowledge of the identity of the 
infringer (Article 10(2)(c) of the Directive). 
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In almost all CEE countries, the limitation periods for bringing actions 
for damages shall be five years (period a tempore scientiae). Latvia, unlike 
the majority of CEE countries, is going to retain the longer 10-year 
limitation period resulting from its civil law, which is compliant with the 
minimum harmonisation clause contained in Article 10(3) of the Directive. 
A significant shortcoming of the Latvian draft Competition Act is, however, 
that it does not deal with the issue of the conflict between civil law and 
commercial law provisions on limitation periods. In the latter case, the 
limitation period is three years and the application of this provision to 
cases where a commercial transaction exists between the infringer and the 
person that has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition 
law would be contrary to the requirements of Article 10(3) of the Directive. 
There is one thing in common between the above approaches in Latvia 
and Slovakia. Also in Slovakia, provisions on limitation periods exist both 
in civil law and commercial law. In the latter case, a general limitation 
period exists that shall start to run when the injured party knows or can 
reasonably be expected to know of the harm suffered and the identity of the 
person liable for damages. Aside from that, there is also a rule according 
to which the limitation period shall anyways expire not later than 10 years 
from the end of the injurious behaviour that caused the harm (an absolute 
limitation period or a period a tempore facti). Under the Slovak law, it is 
ambiguous if this absolute limitation period shall be applicable to actions 
for antitrust damages between undertakings, or if it shall be excluded. It 
is worth mentioning that absolute limitation periods have been proposed 
also in Poland and Slovenia (10 years) as well as in Croatia (15 years). 
Second, the national reports analyse the type of liability of the infringer 
as well as joint and several liability of co-infringers. Recital (11) sentence 5 
of the Directive states that where Member States provide conditions 
for compensation under national law, such as imputability, adequacy or 
culpability, they should be able to maintain such conditions in so far as 
they comply with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence, and the Directive. This provision is not such 
as to discourage CEE countries from maintaining a fault-based model of 
liability in private antitrust enforcement. To put it simply, the majority 
of them have opted for a fault-based model of liability (Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia), in some cases accompanied by the 
presumption of fault (Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland). Only 
Croatia and Slovakia differ in this respect in that they have done something 
completely different and chosen strict liability.
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The next pages of the national reports are devoted to the principle 
of joint and several civil liability of competition law infringers. As a rule, 
CEE countries do not need to introduce this principle, as embodied in 
Article 11(1) of the Directive, since – as the national reports assert – they 
already have it in their laws with regard to competition law infringements. 
The focus is then on the transposition of the details contained in Article 
11(2)–(6) of the Directive. Whether it has anything to do with the ambiguity 
of some of the provisions of Article 11, or with the fact that it seems to 
contain some mistakes, but certain CEE countries tend to supplement and 
correct the transposed provisions. For example, Article 11(2) regarding small 
or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) refers to their definitions contained 
in a piece of ‘soft’ law, namely Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC. 
Slovakia corrected this reference so that now it refers to Commission 
Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories 
of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty.1 The drafters of the new Slovenian rules, instead of 
making a reference to ‘soft’ or binding law, copied the definitions into 
the draft law transposing the Directive. Both countries realized that micro 
enterprises are missing from Article 11(2) of the Directive, and so they made 
efforts aimed at correcting this in their national transposing provisions. The 
Hungarian legislature added to the elements of the definition of SMEs that 
the infringing enterprise must be a SME during the whole duration of the 
unlawful behaviour, in order to take advantage of the analysed provision. 
Article 11(2) states that the infringer is liable only to its own direct and 
indirect purchasers. Direct and indirect providers are missing from this 
paragraph, so when drafting their national transposing provisions, the Czech 
Republic and Poland filled this gap. When transposing Article 11(2)(b), 
the drafters of the new Slovenian rules, replaced the word ‘irretrievably’ 
with ‘undoubtedly’. Moreover, Slovakian, Czech, Estonian and Slovenian 
legal drafters copied into national provisions related to SMEs the provision 
of Article 11(4)(b) of the Directive relevant to immunity recipients, even 
though this is not so provided in the Directive. On the other hand, the 
Croatian standpoint is that adding such provisions is impermissible, since 
SMEs have received preferential treatment in the Directive. Interestingly, 
Croatian draft law transposing the Directive sets out exemplary objective 
criteria for determining the relative share of co-infringers in the entire 
harm caused by the infringement. Such determination shall be based upon 
all the circumstances of a case, such as market share, turnover, role in 
1 OJ L 187, 26.06.2014, p. 1.
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the cartel or other infringement etc. The proposed provision is going to 
codify Recital 37 of the preamble of the Directive. Last, in Hungarian law, 
the scope of the liability of the immunity recipient has been extended as 
a result of the transposition of the Directive, since Hungary previously 
had rules restricting their liability inspired by the European Commission’s 
White Paper of 2008. 
Next, the national reports grasp the crucial issues of quantification of 
harm. All CEE countries either drafted a rebuttable presumption following 
Article 17(2) of the Directive or had such rules beforehand (Czech Republic, 
Hungary). The scope of the presumption is different in various countries. In 
the majority of CEE countries, the presumption is limited only to cartels. 
On the other hand, the scope of the Polish draft includes both types 
of infringements covered by the Directive (anticompetitive agreements, 
decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices and abuses 
of a dominant position). The Romanian draft covers anticompetitive 
agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices. 
Hungary, from 2009, has a rebuttable presumption that a cartel results 
in a price increase of 10%. It is not a presumption of ‘some’ harm but 
a presumption of harm in a given amount. The same solution can be found 
in the Latvian draft. This type of provisions may raise doubts as to their 
conformity with Recital (47) sentence 3 of the Preamble of the Directive 
(‘This presumption should not cover the concrete amount of harm’). CEE 
countries already had provisions giving their courts the power to estimate the 
amount of harm sustained. However, some of them are going to introduce 
leges speciales to their general principles (Czech Republic, Croatia). Out 
of the three countries that implemented the Directive already (Hungary, 
Lithuania, Slovakia), Slovakia is in this group and discrepancies between the 
national law and the Directive have not been avoided here. The Directive 
allows for the estimation of harm if it is practically impossible or excessively 
difficult to precisely quantify the harm. Slovak law allows for such estimation 
where it is absolutely impossible or disproportionally difficult to precisely 
quantify the harm. 
As to interest, even though the solution contained in Recital (12) of 
the Preamble of the Directive, whereby interest is due from the time when 
the harm occurred, was so far uncommon in CEE countries, most of them 
decided to introduce it. However, Estonian drafters proposed that interest 
is due from the time when the injured person filed a claim for damages. 
According to the Polish draft, if the basis of calculating damages are prices 
from a date other than the date of calculating damages, the party injured by 
the infringement of competition law can also claim interest for the period 
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from the day the prices of which were the basis of calculating damages to 
the day when the claim for damages is due. 
Rules on passing-on of overcharges (Articles 12–16 of the Directive) 
seem the least problematic when it comes to substantive law issues. The 
laws of the majority of CEE countries have already embodied general 
rules regarding this topic and detailed rules on this issue were transposed 
to their national draft statutes quite literally.
VI. Procedural issues
With respect to procedural issues, the transposition of the effect of national 
decisions does not seem to be subject to difficulties, but only with regard to 
the effect of infringement decisions adopted in individual Member States by 
their own competition authorities (non-cross-border effect of such decisions). 
CEE countries unanimously opt for the binding effect of this type of decisions 
(‘irrefutably’ establishing an infringement) in compliance with the maximum 
harmonisation clause contained in Article  9(1) of the Directive. However, 
even here there are some differences between the choices of particular CEE 
countries with regard to the scope of the concept of ‘decision’. For example, 
in Bulgarian draft provisions contain the binding effect of not only ‘positive’ 
decisions (infringement decisions) but also ‘negative decisions’ where the 
NCA has not ruled that a party is in breach of competition law. Interestingly, 
the same approach was taken by Hungary but only before the transposition 
of the Directive. In Romania, the draft provisions on the binding effect of 
decisions cover not only administrative decisions by its NCA, but also earlier 
civil court decisions rendered in a private litigation case involving the same 
plaintiff and the same infringement. 
A much more visible diversity can be found with regard to a cross-
border effect of national decisions referred to in Article 9(2) of the 
Directive, constituting a minimum harmonisation clause (‘at least prima 
facie evidence’). None of the CEE countries chose to provide them with the 
same standard of effect as in the case of non-cross-border effect of their own 
decisions. The majority opted for a rebuttable presumption (Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). In Slovakia, however, there 
are serious doubts regarding the interpretation of the adopted provision 
whereby the final decision on a competition infringement issued in another 
Member State is considered evidence of the infringement unless it is proven 
otherwise in the court proceedings on damages claims. Furthermore, in 
Lithuania, circumstances indicated in decisions of NCAs of other Members 
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States shall be considered fully proven until and unless they are contradicted 
by other relevant evidence, except for witness evidence (as a rule). Estonian 
drafters plan to retain a rule according to which it is allowed to present 
decisions of NCAs of other Members States as evidence. Polish drafters 
proposed not to change its procedural rules at all, claiming that they already 
contain the concept of prima facie evidence in the form of the so-called 
factual presumption. Last, Bulgaria disregarded Article 9(2) of the Directive 
and no special effect is going to be accorded to decisions of NCAs of other 
Members States when presented before Bulgarian courts. 
Regarding disclosure of evidence, CEE countries have, as a rule, 
established or are going to establish the same principles as the Directive 
(Articles 5–8 of the Directive). However, the Czech provisions will allow for 
pre-trial discovery, whereas the Directive prescribes disclosure of evidence 
only after the proceedings concerning damages are initiated. Article 5(2) of 
the Directive requires Member States to ensure that national courts are able 
to order the disclosure of specified items of evidence or relevant categories 
of evidence. The last concept seems to generate doubts in CEE countries. 
The Croatian draft provisions make it possible for the parties to obtain 
court-assisted disclosure of specified or specifiable evidences; the drafters 
of these provisions believe that the latter will be considered equivalent to 
‘relevant categories of evidence’. On the other hand, the Czech Republic has 
not drafted any provisions on this concept at all but proposed the usage of 
the minimum harmonisation clause of the Directive (Article 5(8)) that allows 
for maintaining or introducing rules which would lead to wider disclosure of 
evidence than provided for in the Directive. Another unique Czech solution 
refers to the obligation of the claimant requesting evidence disclosure to 
pay an up-front guarantee of up to 4,000  Eur and a limitation, in the 
case of damages claims, regarding the abuse of disclosed evidence. Rules 
on the disclosure of evidence need some ‘muscle behind them’, therefore 
CEE countries introduce sanctions for failure to comply with those rules, 
including fines. It seems that if undertakings or their representatives risk 
a fine, it can prevent such behaviour. At least in some CEE countries, the 
planned or introduced fines seem a sufficiently deterrent: in Croatia – up 
to 1% of the annual turnover, in Romania – from 0.1% to 1% of the 
annual turnover, in the Czech Republic – up to 1% of the annual turnover 
or 400,000 Eur (and joint and several liability for the fine), in Bulgaria 
– up to 250,000 Eur, in Hungary – up to 160,000 Eur, in Slovenia – up 
to 50,000 Eur. By contrast, in Lithuania such fines may only reach up to 
10,000 Eur, in Estonia – 3,200 Eur, in Slovakia – 800 Eur or 2,000 Eur (in 
case of repeated infringements) and in Latvia – 40 Eur (!). 
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As to standing to sue, that is who is entitled to apply for judicial 
proceedings, in CEE countries, as a rule, general rules apply. The standing 
to sue does not suffer from any material limitations, except in Bulgaria 
where stand-alone actions have not been permissible so far. Even though 
the Directive does not require Member States to provide for the standing 
of ‘someone acting on behalf of one or more alleged injured parties’ 
(Article  2(4) of the Directive), some CEE countries already have such 
solutions (Romania, Hungary) or plan to introduce them (Poland). 
The legal bases for collective private enforcement of competition law in 
CEE countries exist in only three CEE countries – Bulgaria, Lithuania and 
Poland. The transposition of the Directive has not been used in any of them 
as an opportunity to make amendments to the existing solutions. None of 
the remaining CEE countries decided to introduce a legal framework for 
collective private enforcement of competition law alongside the transposition 
of the Directive. In Slovenia, however, a draft law on collective redress is 
being prepared. 
VII. Consensual dispute resolution
As a rule, provisions on consensual dispute resolution in antitrust 
enforcement (Articles 18–19 of the Directive) were, or are going to be 
transposed into national laws of CEE countries without substantial changes 
to the text of the Directive. Most of them already have provisions on the 
suspension of limitation for the duration of any consensual dispute resolution 
process, or are going to introduce them. The Czech Republic is the exception 
here – there is no such provision under Czech law. However, in the case 
of Slovenia and Poland, their legal drafters have not regarded all possible 
types of out-of-court dispute resolution as consensual dispute resolution 
which would suspend the limitation period – only the existent formalized 
types of consensual dispute resolution qualify as such. The majority of 
CEE countries either already have, or intend to introduce a rule whereby 
their NCAs may consider compensation paid as a result of a consensual 
settlement, and prior to its decision imposing a fine, to be a  mitigating 
factor with respect to setting the amount of such fine (Article  18(3) of 
the Directive). This does not refer to Croatian draft provisions but their 
drafters do not see this omission as a particular problem; most consensual 
settlements will follow a prior infringement decision and the application of 
this rule will most likely be quite uncommon. Last, Slovakian law differs 
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with regard to its equivalent of Article 19(1) of the Directive – where the 
Directive excludes from the claim the whole ‘share’ of the settling infringer, 
Slovak law excludes only the extent to which the injured party was satisfied.
VIII. Conclusions
To sum this up, it seems that in many instances CEE countries introduced, 
or are going to introduce the changes required by the Damages Directive. 
They have conducted a more or less intensive scrutiny of legal areas such as 
civil law, procedural law and competition law. However, at the same time, 
they have also added further complications to an already quite complex 
and inefficient systems of competition law enforcement. The system of 
competition law enforcement is becoming a more highly regulated and 
codified field in CEE countries. It is very unlikely that after the amendments 
claimants will find redress much easier, cheaper and quicker. After making 
the above comparisons, I believe that the solutions used in the neighbouring 
countries may be described a ‘patchwork’. At the point of departure, 
the national solution of CEE countries represented a puzzle that posed 
difficulties when being harmonised according to the EU model. Not very 
much has changed after the harmonisations works. However, this is so 
largely also because the EU model is imperfect to some extent.
The Authors of the national reports seem partly optimistic and partly 
pessimistic as to the future of private antitrust enforcement in CEE 
countries. Admittedly, some of the rules of the Directive will contribute 
to the improvement of tools available to claimants and authorities. For 
example, limitation periods will be more reasonable and will suffice to allow 
injured parties to bring actions, even follow-on actions. Access to evidence 
will probably be better. On the other hand, some areas of private antitrust 
enforcement have been omitted by the Directive and/or the legal drafters 
and/or legislatures of CEE countries, which may result in that pursuing 
claims will not become much easier at all. For example, no incentives for 
consumers were introduced, in particular to initiate collective actions. It 
does not seem likely that any of the CEE countries could become the 
‘target’ of forum shopping, with their respective legal frameworks for private 
antitrust enforcement. It remains to be seen whether and how the new rules 
will be applied in practice and how their deficiencies will be overcome by 
national courts.
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From the book reviews:
(...) I consider the publication of the book very valuable. All analyses 
are deep, thorough and well structured. They will serve as a gold mine 
of information for all those who are interested in private enforcement of 
competition law, be it legislators, judges, practitioners and academics. 
The comparative dimension of the book will allow readers to evaluate 
each statements and solutions in the light of the legislative choices 
and judicial practice of other countries. The publication of the book 
will certainly contribute to the development of this kind of competition 
law enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe.
Dr hab. Maciej Szpunar, prof. UŚ
University of Silesia, Katowice;
advocate general, CJEU
All CEE (EU-) countries have recently been facing common need 
for implementation of the Damages Directive. These countries 
share something more common than geographical proximity and 
neighbourhood only. Their legal history and tradition and so called 
path-depenence often resemble, too. It is therefore important and 
useful to compare the starting positions of these countries, main 
problems accompanying the process of implementation and to 
discuss the possibilities how to solve and overcome the difficulties 
and obstacles connected therewith. The book contributes without 
any doubts to achieving this goal.
Prof. Dr. Josef Bejček
Masaryk University, Brno
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